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“A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR
21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER”
A View from Outside
Geoffrey Till

N

avies everywhere are grappling with the security issues they confront in the
post-9/11 world. This is a difficult task, because they face issues that seem
so much more complicated than we remember them to have been during the
Cold War. Partly because of the ending of that conflict, for the moment at least,
but mainly because of the impact of globalization, the concept of security has
expanded from notions that are mainly military to encompass the dimensions of
political security, economic security, societal security, and environmental security. All of these may apply at the level of the individual citizen, groups in the national population, the nation, the region, or the world. Moreover, these
dimensions and levels are intimately connected with one another, vertically and
horizontally, so that a response to a discerned threat at
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Moreover, there is a temporal dimension to all this:
Services Command and Staff College, he has taught at
the Royal Naval College Greenwich, Britannia Royal
what a country does now, in response to a clear and imNaval College Dartmouth, City University, and the
mediate danger, may have untold implications for its
Open University; he earned his PhD at King’s College
London. Professor Till was a visiting scholar at the U.S.
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desired effects. To make their full contribution, miliKippenberger Chair at the Victoria University of
tary forces will need to think about their traditional
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experience of Iraq and Afghanistan adds urgency to the
call—or so, at least, the argument goes.
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Other analysts, however, wonder how real, how new, or how permanent this
development actually is. They argue that the Cold War really did not seem so
simple at the time and that while the major focus may have been on the potentially deadly confrontation between East and West over the established battle
lines of Europe, many quite important things were going on elsewhere that
called upon Western forces to respond in a variety of ways far removed from the
brutal simplicities of the Central Front. Moreover, Colin Gray is not alone in
writing of “another bloody century,” in which many new threats may seem much
less dominant when compared to the possible recurrence of traditional
1
state-on-state wars. These potential wars continue to call for a set of approaches, military disciplines, and capabilities that seem really quite familiar.
Therefore, goes the alternative view, what we have is at most a difference of degree, and it is far too early to conclude that the elements of change, to the extent
that they exist, constitute a permanent trend to which military forces need to
adapt, rather than a temporary blip that they need to absorb.
These two approaches have been labeled, respectively, the “postmodern,” or
“nontraditional,” way of thinking about the role and character of military forces,
and the “modern,” or “traditional.” When it comes to sizing and shaping the
fleet, there are obvious tensions between these two approaches. Many navies
around the world are thinking through their own answers to this set of conundrums, and there has been a great deal of interest in how the U.S. Navy would
seek to square this particular circle. How will its strategic thinking develop? How
will it structure the fleet? How will it operate? How should everyone else respond? Accordingly, the rest of the world has awaited “A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower” with, if not bated breath, at least real interest in both
the process and the outcome of the debate.
SO WHAT’S NEW?
The U.S. Navy’s approach to strategy making was certainly intended to be novel.
The former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mike Mullen, launched
the campaign for a new strategy in June 2006. “When I initiated the discussion of
what it should be,” he said, “my view was that we needed one. We hadn’t had one
in 20-plus years and you need a strategy which is going to underpin how we operate, what our concepts were, and literally how we invest.” The scope and scale
of new threats, the complexity of globalization, and the staggering rate of change
seemed to make a major rethinking necessary. The task was handed over to Vice
Admiral John Morgan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information,
Plans and Strategy.
Rather as the British had done a decade earlier with their Strategic Defence
Review of 1997, the U.S. Navy decided to make the process as inclusive of all
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major stakeholders as possible. “One of the things I [Mullen] said when I came
in as CNO [was that] I am not going to move ahead on major decisions without
doing this with my other four stars. So the U.S. Marine Corps and Coastguard
were in the process from the start. The Navy also decided to hold a series of ‘con2
versations with America.’” In some ways, the process was as important as the
product, since if successful it would yield not only a strategy but also a constituency of opinion that might be expected to help with its implementation later on.
Finally, foreign engagement was sought in aspects of the strategy, through the
International Seapower Symposiums of 2005 and 2007, a variety of naval staff
talks, and academic engagements abroad. The new CNO, Admiral Gary
Roughead, argues that “this was an approach that was very different than in the
past when we engaged more than just a very small cell of Navy thinkers. We
3
heard from other leaders in our country about the use of maritime power.”
The problem with this, paradoxically, was that the degree of prior involvement in the process and the extent to which developing concepts, such as the
“thousand-ship navy”/Global Maritime Partnership, were telegraphed in advance combined to make the new strategy appear less than wholly new when it
finally appeared. Moreover, at least some of the ideas it contained had appeared
before in earlier formulations. Recognizing the tectonic shifts in strategy caused
by the end of the Cold War, another doctrinal formulation, “. . . From the Sea,”
had in 1992 already shifted the emphasis away from power at sea and toward
power from the sea. This closer coordination of the Navy and the Marine Corps
was symbolized by the equal positioning of their service logos on the front cover
of the document. The shock of 9/11 caused another such shift, leading to a new
emphasis on counterterrorism and asymmetric operations. Such thoughts had
also been illuminated and advanced in the four broad naval mission areas identified by the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review process:

• Conducting an active and layered defense against aggression from forward
locations not dependent on the land bases of other nations

• Ensuring the access of joint forces to contested areas where adversaries seek
to exclude U.S. presence

• Enabling the success of joint forces ashore through the provision of firepower, mobility, intelligence, and logistics support

• Defending the seaward approaches to the American homeland against an
array of conventional and unconventional threats.

4

Even the equal treatment given winning and preventing wars can be seen as
less than novel given the great stress on deterrence in the Cold War era, which
was after all about preventing war. However, what does seem to be different is the
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much wider conception of what deterrence actually means and actually requires
these days. The coercive approach of demonstrating denial capabilities against,
or promising punishment for, prospective wrongdoers has been absorbed into a
much wider concept of working against the social, environmental, and economic conditions that make wrongdoing more likely. These postmodern conceptions of seapower had, however, been signaled in parts of the “Naval
Operations Concept” and the “Navy Strategic Plan” of 2006.
These conceptions are, nevertheless, key to the novelty, and indeed the attractiveness, of the strategy. It is much more comprehensive in its approach and
seems much more aware of the implications and consequences of the broader,
earlier concepts of security. The same might be said when it comes to the document’s implementation. The extent of the stress on cooperation and mutual dependence between the three maritime services is new: it solidifies the emerging
partnership between the Marine Corps and the Navy, on the one hand, and between the Navy and the Coast Guard, on the other. It underlines the thinking behind the “National Fleet” concept of and, to some extent at least operationalizes
the objectives contained in, the White House’s 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security. The admittedly brief discussion of distributed and disaggregated
command decision making may suggest something of a shift in naval thinking
away from task force–centric operations characteristic of the Navy to the tactical
platform-centric approach of the Coast Guard. The extent to which the Navy
may be signaling a willingness to engage in what would elsewhere be regarded as
constabulary operations is significant too. But note, there are a lot of “may be’s”
here.
The specific importance attached to humanitarian aid and disaster relief is,
however, quite novel. Instead of being something of bonus when the need arises
and assets are available because there is no decent war to fight elsewhere, the task
is accepted as part of one of the six strategic imperatives, and the ability to do it
has apparently been elevated to equal standing with more traditional core capabilities like forward presence and sea control.
But perhaps the most striking departure of all is the consolidation of the
Global Maritime Partnership initiative, which becomes one of the six strategic
imperatives and which is clearly crucial to two of the six core capabilities,
namely maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
Since this initiative has grown out of Admiral Mullen’s earlier concept of a
5
“thousand-ship navy,” this is not entirely new, of course. But the retitling of the
concept is more than merely cosmetic. It suggests a significant move away from
the traditional “modern” thinking that probably explains the label originally
given to the concept. Zippy as it was, the “thousand-ship navy” was profoundly
misleading, since it seemed to exclude coast guard forces, had clear hierarchical
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connotations that inevitably sparked unwelcome questions as to “who’s in
charge,” and raised equally unfortunate suspicions that the Navy’s hidden aspirations were to re-create on a grander scale the “six-hundred-ship navy” of the
Ronald Reagan years. Hence, in Admiral Morgan’s words, “We are beginning to
6
distance ourselves from that moniker.” Many people will therefore welcome the
complete disappearance of the term from the document as the passing of a distraction from what is otherwise a persuasive concept. It is noticeable also that
the Global Maritime Partnership would benefit significantly from all three of
the document’s implementation priorities.
It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that there are indeed new, postmodern elements to the new strategy that go alongside the old and that, in Loren Thompson’s words, “it is hard to argue with such a reasonable approach to global
7
security.”
CRITICISMS
Nonetheless, there have been criticisms—in fact, quite a few.8 To a large extent this
is inevitable, as the document seeks to cover a vast subject in comparatively few
words, no doubt on the assumption that no one would actually read anything longer. In less than four thousand words it reviews extraordinarily complicated
changes in the world scene and seeks to lay down a strategy that defines in doctrinal, operational, and procurement terms the objectives, methods, and supporting implementation plans for the world’s biggest navy, marine corps, and coast
guard. Moreover, it was produced through a process of consultation with the widest range of maritime stakeholders imaginable. The new statement of strategy is
essentially a compromise in length, in overall posture, and in detailed substance.
Given the level of compression and the complexity of the subject, a measure of superficiality and (possibly constructive) ambiguity is perhaps inevitable.
Each of the major stakeholders consulted in the process could, however, argue
with some justification that their respective particular interests have not been
given due weight. The “kinetic” community, preoccupied by the possible recurrence of interstate war with a strategic competitor in twenty or thirty years’ time
or by the possibility of a conflict with a country like Iran or North Korea in the
nearer term, might well feel that the pendulum has swung much too far from
“hard” to “soft” maritime power. The absence of reference to strike operations
and amphibious assault in the discussion of power projection has already been
noted. According to some observers, earlier drafts of the document had even less
reference to the sources of kinetic effect. In the final text, references to theater
ballistic missile defense are hidden away rather uncomfortably in the discussion
on deterrence, for example. This partly explains the emphasis on the need to
stick with “the Mahanian insistence on U.S. Navy maritime dominance” given
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by Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter. “Let there be no mistake,” he said. “We
are not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those elements of hard power that win wars—or deter them from ever breaking out in the
first place. . . . The strength of a nation’s navy remains an essential measure of a
9
great power’s status and role in the world.”
Attitudes on where the balance in doctrine and force structure is to be struck in
the document between hard and soft power may well partly depend on where the
observer “sits,” in terms of geography and maritime discipline. Aviators may well
tend toward a more kinetic approach, especially if they operate in areas where local conflict against middle powers seems a quite possible contingency. The attention of submariners and those in the antisubmarine community will be fixated on
the need to respond to the growing reach and sophistication of possible competitors like China or of middle powers with access to new and improved attack submarines, whether conventional or nuclear powered, and consequently may feel
that still more could have been said about the future importance of their crafts.
Operators in regions such as Africa, Europe, or South America will tend, simply by
virtue of their operational priorities, to be more interested in softer capacities like
riverine or patrol operations or civil-military affairs; they too may feel, though,
that their concerns could have been given greater emphasis.
Against this, the coast guard community might think that its side of the strategy has been played down in the document. It might well feel that the document
uses “seapower” as a synonym for naval power rather than as an alternative to
“maritime power” and that the default understanding of the former term will
lessen attention to the contribution made by the U.S. Coast Guard. The constabulary role and law enforcement are crucial aspects of maritime security in its
newer and wider sense but seem rather glossed over, at least in the sense that
there are no specific references to the fact that in the United States such activities
are the domain of the Coast Guard rather than the Navy. Given the evident importance attributed by the document to wider engagement with other countries,
where primary concerns in maritime security tend to be things like the protection of fisheries and the interception of drugs, arms, and people smugglers, this
apparent neglect would seem particularly unfortunate. It would be no very great
step from this perspective to suspicion that the Navy is using this wider concept
of maritime security to help justify a building program of ships that are by no
means appropriate to its enforcement.
Merchant-ship building and operating and the marine industrial complex
represent another constituency in the maritime community that might feel neglected. Such interests also have a contribution to make, objections and dissents
to table, and strategic needs to be met. That the U.S. Navy’s construction program has been relatively stable for the last two years is in important part a
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response to industry’s requirements for reliable planning baselines. Electoral as
well as national considerations mean that members of Congress have a
huge—and, some suspect, determining—political stake in such outcomes. For
all these reasons, these concerns might have been more directly addressed.
Aside from criticisms proceeding from particular constituencies and stakeholders who feel that their particular angles on the issue should have been
given more weight, a second set focuses on the document as a statement of
strategy. Current events in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that the United States
and its allies have encountered real difficulty in coming up with connected,
seamless guidance as to how broad policy objectives at the grand-strategic end
of the scale should be implemented at the other (operational and tactical) end,
now and in the plannable future. The contention is that they have a set of visionary statements and detailed force structure plans but that the two often do
not match up.
As a result, according to this view, the allies went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan with a broad sense of what needed to be done but without the resources or
sometimes the institutional framework needed to do it. In consequence, there
is a great focus on satisfying the tyrannical demands of the immediate commitment. In consequence, the future is being mortgaged to the present. This is
not a criticism of the new maritime strategy so much as a comment that it is by
no means clear where the document fits into the family of policy statements
that the United States—or any other country, for that matter—needs in order
10
to translate policy into successful action.
Relatedly, more specific questions can be raised about the connections between this document and force structure, particularly but not exclusively in
the U.S. Navy. One angle, as already noted, is to argue that this document is actually an attempt to justify a set of building plans already established in the
2006 Navy Strategic Plan, already referred to, which was introduced by Admiral Mullen in order to provide stability in the Navy’s shipbuilding program.
Some are quite clear about what they see as
the Navy’s latest attempt to articulate the role of maritime forces, and to provide a
sensible justification for its plan to increase the current 278-ship fleet to 313 during
the next three decades. Navy officials worry that fleet expansion efforts could be
wrecked if the Defense Department cuts naval budgets to pay for the addition of
thousands of troops to the Army and Marine Corps over the next four years.11

Indeed, Secretary Winter made the point that “our 30-year ship-building
program remains unchanged; our aircraft purchasing schedule remains on
track; and our end strength targets will not change as a result of this new strategy.” If this was indeed the intention, things were, arguably, taken up in the
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wrong order: the building plan should be derived from an open examination
of need, not the latter crafted to suit the former.
Another line of attack on the relationship between the document and the
building plan, however, is to argue the exact opposite. Some make the point that
this is not a “strategy” at all, in the sense that it does not relate ways and means in
a manner that would offer much guidance to force planners in any of the three
maritime services. The document is more of an overall “vision” that seeks to establish general things that need to be done but avoids discussion about what is
needed to get those things done. A “former senior officer” reportedly complains,
“There’s nothing in there about force planning. Do I build capital ships for major wars that don’t occur often, or do I build for general purpose, lower-end
12
ships for the kinds of events we encounter far more regularly?” Nor does it give
much clue about relative priorities between modern and postmodern maritime
approaches, priorities that in an age of budgetary constraint must compete to
some extent. According to some, “by not including or even alluding to a recapitalization plan in the strategy, the Navy missed a golden opportunity to link its
13
strategy and equipment needs in a single clear case for lawmakers.”
But perhaps, some wonder, there is a new accompanying, classified annex that
does articulate and justify Navy building plans and that supports the aspiration
14
to a 313-ship navy, if not more. Vice Admiral Morgan offers a more subtle explanation. He has spoken of his hope that “the new strategy will ‘lead strategic
thinking’ in the formation of future budgets. The intention is for the strategy to
be ‘refreshed’ every two years, right before long-term budget plans are final15
ized.” In other words, the strategy is intended to provide continuing on-course
guidance for the existing programs, which it therefore accompanies, rather than
precedes or follows.
Moreover, the timing of the debate is interesting, seeming as it does to imply
readiness on the part of the maritime services to get people thinking about
American defense needs after Iraq and Afghanistan, by which time the political
complexions of White House and Congress may be rather different.
For all that, it is clear that there is no pleasing everybody; the very nature of
the document required major compromise by all the participants. The Navy
could hardly have made a more specific claim to more ambitious force structure,
in general or in particular naval-discipline terms, in an abbreviated document
that it was producing jointly with the other two maritime services. Nor could
they have done so themselves. The maritime services, in this collective bid to
draw national attention to the importance of the physical environment in and
across which they all operate, also needed to be mindful of the fact that this was
not a statement of national policy. The subject area this document sought to address is vast—geographically, substantively, and temporally; its treatment
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required massive compression. Accordingly the statement could hardly have had
the crisp exactitude and the articulated performance indicators of, for example,
the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. For all these reasons a final verdict on the
importance and impact of this document will need to wait upon events. The
proof of the pudding will be in the eating.
SO WHAT’S NEXT?
If the new strategy is to convince observers that it really is the significant departure from the norm that it is claimed to be, its progenitors will need to convince
skeptics by what they do now that it has been introduced. A serious and sustained campaign of strategic communication among the stakeholders themselves, among them and the rest of the country, and among the United States and
other countries seems called for as a first step. The (mis)apprehensions noted
above will need to be addressed.
In particular, this is an ideal time for the United States to progress a campaign
of (re)engagement with the rest of the world, given the strains induced by the
Iraq war. Here the problem is exemplified by global worries that the United
States is not only too powerful but also inclined to often self-defeating
unilateralism. It is against this background that the debate about ratification by
the United States of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—significantly, represented by its American adversaries as “LOST” (i.e., the Law of
the Sea Treaty)—is being followed by the outside world. Critics of the proposal
to ratify clearly argue from a rigorous set of traditional, modern conceptions of
16
U.S. sovereignty and national interest.
White House and Navy proponents, however, believe that UNCLOS provides
an indispensable legal framework for most activities in support of maritime security. Some would admit that the UN generally lends authority for more ambitious acts of system defense. The perception, whether true or not, that the
United States and its allies are “acting outside the law” undermines their prospects of success. Accordingly, ratification of the convention would indeed seem
to imply acceptance by the United States of the notion that its maritime security
is best provided in concert with everyone else’s.
With this we approach the most postmodern aspect of American maritime
thinking in this document, the continual references to its “collaborative” nature.
Although most countries find the notion of a Global Maritime Partnership attractive, there are residual suspicions about whether the United States really
means it.17 This unease is manifested by Africa’s hesitations about the new U.S.
Africa Command—Africa, the locals say, is not about to be commanded by the
United States. A real partnership will need to acknowledge this, to accept that in
many cases local alliances will provide the first responses to local troubles and
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that local priorities in the maintenance of good order at sea are not necessarily
the same as those of the United States. Americans tend to put “international terrorism” at the top of the list of threats; other countries are much more concerned
about illegal fishing or people smuggling. Even Europeans often do not put
18
counterterrorism at the head of their priority lists.
Certainly, with its emphasis on building the trust that cannot be surged, in
the strategy document—and, indeed, in the public statements of regional commanders around the world—there is at least declaratory acceptance of the need
to accommodate such differences of view. As Admiral Mullen said, “The
changed strategic landscape offers new opportunities for maritime forces to
work together—sometimes with the U.S. Navy, but oftentimes without. In fact, a
greater number of today’s emerging missions won’t involve the U.S. Navy. And
19
that’s fine with me.”
Putting the concept of partnership into effect, however, will require practical
steps. These may include a concerted effort to make “maritime domain awareness” work, by moving from an information culture based on “need to know” to
one based on “need to share,” and by openhanded provision of skills and equipment in a sophisticated capability-building campaign for countries that need it.
“Sophisticated,” in this case, means two things. First, it connotes practical appreciation of the need fully to integrate naval efforts with coast guards, both foreign
and domestic, in a manner that gives the latter full credit for their particular
strengths in this area. Second, it will require particular awareness of the political
and cultural sensitivities of regions in question. The current emphasis on language training and cultural awareness, together with the creation of a “Civil Affairs Command” of Foreign Area Officers, is an encouraging step in this
direction. So also were the demonstrations of intent evident in the recent cruises
of the hospital ships Mercy and Comfort, when viewed alongside effective reactions of the U.S. Navy toward natural disasters like the 2004 tsunami. Actions, after all, speak louder than words, and these are the kinds of things likely to make a
reality of the concept of “global fleet stations” and to persuade others that the
20
maritime services really mean what they say in this document. All of this seems
to presage a move away from the techno-centric thinking that seems to have
characterized U.S. defense policy over the past few years.
But, as already remarked, the rest of the world is not the only constituency of
concern that needs to be addressed in a continuing campaign of justification.
Different justifications may need to be given to domestic stakeholders, and some
of these may well compete with the messages that need to be transmitted to foreigners. For instance, the kinetic community will need to be assured that its
“modern” but perfectly legitimate concerns about the need to continue to pre21
pare for the prospect of interstate war are addressed. Getting the right balance
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between hard and soft maritime power is particularly problematic when naval
budgets are tight, partly because of the inevitable political concentration on the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars and on a building program mired in controversy.
Such concentration exacerbates the concerns of people who, like Robert Kaplan,
argue that the U.S. Navy is moving too far away from traditional naval threats
22
from first- and second-class adversaries now and in the more distant future.
Instead, they argue, it should focus its efforts on such “modern” preoccupations
as the acquisition of more sophisticated antisubmarine systems, supercarriers,
and sea-based ballistic- and cruise-missile defense, the Zumwalt-class destroyers, and the CG(X) cruiser.
These, of course, are expensive and encourage the trend toward smaller fleets,
whereas having fewer builds makes safe, incremental modernization of the fleet
more difficult. That in turn forces the Navy into specifying “transformational”
leaps in platform specification, as evidenced in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
the Zumwalts, and CG(X), programs that are inherently riskier and costlier to fix
than their predecessors when things go wrong. Although the new maritime
strategy does not go into this issue (because it does not address relative priorities, as remarked earlier), questions will have to be asked and answered about the
balance that should be struck in the “high/low” mix.
The LCS program is particularly important from this point of view, and its
current difficulties are therefore especially unfortunate. But even within the
program, there are those who argue that something cheaper and less capable but
more numerous would provide a better solution. Lower-intensity postmodern
operations would seem to many to call for still greater expansion of riverine capabilities, significant reentry into the small-patrol-craft area, and something of
a deemphasis on the mainly Mahanian aspects of the current shipbuilding program. William Lind complains, “The U.S. Navy is building a fleet perfectly designed to fight the navy of imperial Japan. If someone wants to contest control of
the Pacific Ocean in a war between aircraft carrier task forces, we are ready.” Lind
recalls a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Jim Thomas, saying (as
cited by Robert Kaplan), “The Navy is not primarily about low-level raiding, piracy patrols, and riverine warfare. If we delude ourselves into thinking that it is,
we’re finished as a great power.” On the contrary, Lind argues, in today’s
postmodern, fourth-generation world that is precisely what naval power is all
23
about—or ought to be.
Getting these budgetary and force structure balances right and giving real effect to the ideas sketched out in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower” call for the open debate it is already getting but also for a clear sense
of national strategy, one in which the place of maritime forces in the overall response to a complex present and future world is seriously addressed. Such an
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overall, joined-up strategy should do two things. First, it should seriously address the task of deterring or winning today’s conflicts while being able to secure
the “peace” that would follow. Second, it should define and balance the needs of
today’s conflicts with those of tomorrow’s. Easier said than done, perhaps—these issues are unlikely to be resolved quickly or easily, but they are essential all the same, and their difficulty points to the need for the continued
dialogue that preconditions ultimate agreement.
LIKELY FOREIGN REACTIONS
It is not easy to gauge likely foreign reactions to the new strategy. Inevitably,
some will be responses to the process that produced and now follows production
of the document rather than to what it actually says. In the course of this, some
outsiders are bound to hear things that confirm existing suspicions about U.S.
intentions. Statements intended to assuage the concerns of hard-power advocates in Congress, for example, will unnecessarily alarm those for whom American maritime dominance can be seen as a prospective threat and dismay those
who instead wish to see a real global maritime partnership against common
threats and challenges—hence the need for a strategic information campaign
that explains what is actually, rather than apparently, going on.
Moreover, foreign navies are conducting their own strategic reviews of how
they should react to contemporary challenges. In many cases their debates about
the balance to be struck between hard and soft power and between fewer
high-quality platforms or more lower-quality ones follow similar lines to the
U.S. debate; foreign equivalents of all the interests and constituencies in the U.S.
debate can also be seen. Accordingly, their views about the new U.S. strategy will
tend to reflect their own preoccupations and emerging conclusions, which in
turn will tend to determine what parts of the American process and the product
they focus and comment on.
For this reason, a campaign of strategic communication would probably fall
on receptive ears, at least among the closer allies of the United States, since many
of them are facing identical problems. The United Kingdom, for example, has
yet to develop a national strategy in which the resources available to defense
match the political objectives set for it and in which future needs are secured
against the immediate demands of an urgent present. Because of the focus on
the “here and now,” the Royal Navy is facing acute difficulties in achieving a
24
modern/postmodern balance it is happy with. Here too the aim is to get people
thinking about the world after Iraq. Inevitably, high/low-mix issues dominate
fleet-structure questions. Having secured its future carriers, how many other
top-class surface combatants does the Royal Navy need and can it afford? When
considering the Future Surface Combatant program, what should be the ratio
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between the (relatively) cheap and cheerful C3 variants and the more ambitious
C1s? This is in large measure a matter of resources, but getting the resources
needed seems very much to be a question of getting the message across to a public, a media, and a political establishment largely focused on present land and air,
25
rather than future air and naval, needs.
In a more general way, opinions differ on the extent to which it is safe and appropriate for the Royal Navy to get involved in the lower reaches of the spectrum
of maritime security. Many of these issues apply to the other European navies as
well. They all face growing gaps between the resources apparently available and
the range of possible commitments they may be expected to fulfil. Their fleets are
shrinking numerically but comprise individual units that are ever more powerful.
To a degree, all these force-structure preoccupations reflect widespread acceptance in Europe of an expeditionary impulse, which seems to flow naturally
from the global security concerns that dominate their conceptions of necessary
defense. Accordingly, they will tend to be broadly sympathetic to the aims and
methods outlined in the strategy. Other European countries take more geographically local views of their security priorities and, while not unsympathetic,
will not see much that is directly relevant for them. Caveated support of this
kind will be much more common in the developing world, where residual suspicions of U.S. foreign policy remain strong, although many such countries are
fully aware of the objective need for enhanced maritime security, broadly defined. A few other countries, such as Iran and North Korea, can be expected to
take a dim view of a strategy much of which, they will think, rightly or wrongly,
is essentially aimed at them. It will be especially interesting to see the emerging
reaction of China, and perhaps of Mr. Putin’s Russia, too.
Evidently, in the problems it is having in its quest to adapt to the difficult conditions of the twenty-first century the U.S. Navy is not alone. Current uncertainties and differences of opinion are understandable, even inevitable. But the fact
that even the U.S. Navy seems unable to square the circle on its own suggests that
perhaps a cooperative strategy is indeed the way to go.
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